The eventual failure and price indeterminacy of inflation targeting by Eagle, David
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
The eventual failure and price
indeterminacy of inflation targeting
David Eagle
Eastern Washington University
22. November 2006
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/1883/
MPRA Paper No. 1883, posted 23. February 2007
- 1 - 
The Eventual Failure and 
Price Indeterminacy of Inflation Targeting 
 
David M. Eagle 
 
Department of Management, RVPT#3 
College of Business Administration 
Eastern Washington University 
668 N. Riverpoint Blvd., Suite A 
Spokane, Washington  99202-1660 
USA 
Phone: (509) 358-2245 
Fax: (509) 358-2267 
Email: deagle@ewu.edu 
 
 
Initial Draft: December 13, 2006 
Revised: February 22, 2007 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In stark contrast to the previous literature, we find that IT leads to price 
indeterminacy even when the central bank uses a Taylor-like feedback rule to peg 
the nominal interest rate.  We also find that there is no mechanism with IT to 
determine the current inflation rate or price level.  We conclude that the previous 
literature has either committed mathematical errors involving infinity or misused 
the non-explosive criterion for ruling out speculative bubbles.  To avoid making 
errors involving infinity, we analyze inflation targeting (IT) in a typical rational-
expectations, pure-exchange, general-equilibrium model where the time horizon is 
arbitrarily large, but finite. 
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The Eventual Failure and 
Price Indeterminacy of Inflation Targeting 
 
In the early 1960s, the Phillips curve was the fad in macroeconomics.  However, in the 
late 1960s and the 1970s, changing expectations led to a breakdown in the Phillips curve.  
Today, the current fad in central banking is inflation targeting (IT).  This paper argues that 
changing expectations could lead to a failure of IT in a manner similar to the breakdown in the 
Phillips curve. 
Today many central banks follow some form of IT, including the Bank of England, the 
European Central Bank, and central banks in New Zealand, Canada, Australia and several 
developing countries.  Also, Ben Bernanke, chair of the Federal Reserve Board, endorses 
committing the Federal Reserve to an inflation target.  The definition of IT is that (i) the central 
bank target an inflation rate although it may have competing output-gap goals, (ii)  the central 
bank be very committed to its stated targets and goals, and (iii) the central bank be very 
transparent in its goals and plans concerning monetary policy, including contingency plans.  The 
transparency of the central bank under IT is considered very important for the formation of 
public expectations. 
An alternative to IT is price-level targeting (PLT), where the central bank targets the 
price level instead of the inflation rate.  IT and PLT are very similar. While IT has explicit 
inflation targets, we can derive implied price-level targets from those inflation targets. For 
example, if the central bank targets a 2% inflation rate forever and the current price level is 1.0, 
the implied path of price-level targets would be 1.02t where t is the number of periods from now.  
Also, under PLT we can derive implied inflation targets from the explicit price-level targets. For 
example, if the path of price-level targets is 1.02t, then the implied inflation targets would be 2% 
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each year.  Under PLT, the central bank probably would communicate its intentions by 
announcing its implied inflation target rather than its path of price-level targets because the 
public is more likely to understand the former than the latter.  Therefore, just because the public 
receives information on inflation targets does not mean the public understands that the central 
bank is following IT rather than PLT. 
There is a subtle but very important difference between IT and PLT.  This difference 
concerns the central bank’s contingency plans; it concerns how the central bank reacts to when 
the actual inflation rate differs from its target.  Under PLT, the price-level targets remain 
unchanged regardless of the past inflation rate, whereas under IT they do change.  For example, 
assume that the current price level is 1.0 and the actual or implied inflation target is 2% per year 
forever.  Then the actual or implied path of price-level targets under both IT and PLT would be 
1.02t.  If the actual inflation rate over the first period turns out to be 3% instead of 2% , the 
implied path of price-level targets under IT would change to 1.03(1.02t-1) whereas under PLT, 
the price-level targets would remain the same.  In other words, under PLT, if the price level 
differs from its target, the central bank will take action to bring the price level back to the central 
bank’s original path of price-level targets.  However, under IT, the central bank is more forgiving 
and will respond to the higher price level by changing its implied price-level targets so to be 
consistent with its targeted inflation rate and the actual price level that just occurred.  (Note: This 
paragraph does assume that output gap remains the same throughout these examples.) 
 In this paper, I argue that the contingency-plan difference between IT and PLT is very 
important to the issue about whether monetary policy can determine prices.  Contrary to the 
previous literature, I argue that true IT cannot determine the price level of an economy when the 
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central bank uses the nominal interest rate as its monetary instrument. 1  I do find that the stable 
price-level targets under PLT do provide a solid anchor to the public’s expectations of prices, at 
least if the central bank shows a strong commitment to those price-level targets as it would if it 
follows a strong McCallum-Woodford feedback policy rule for setting the nominal interest rate.  
However, under IT, the public will be unable to form expectations about future price levels 
because the central bank’s implied targeted price levels will change whenever the actual price 
level differs from its target.  This indeterminacy in expectations of future prices leads to an 
indeterminacy in the current price level. 
Consider this scenario: Central banks throughout the world are following IT, but the 
general public is confused and thinks that the central banks are following PLT.  Hence the public 
forms its expectations based on the principles of PLT.  Initially, price levels are stable.  
However, over time the public will learn from experience about how the central banks handle 
situations where the actual inflation rate differs from its target and come to realize that the 
central banks are following IT instead of PLT.  The public’s expectations will shift as a result of 
this realization.  If I am right that IT leads to price indeterminacy when the public understands 
IT, then this shift of expectations would bring instability to the price levels of the world’s 
economies.  Thus, the issue of whether or not IT determines prices could have profound 
implications to the world’s economies. 
In practice, IT is complicated by the fact that central banks following IT also have goals 
and objectives concerning output gap.  However, economists often have to assume that “all other 
things remain the same.”  In particular, when this paper discussed the examples to illustrate the 
difference between IT and PLT, we assumed that output gap remained the same. In this paper, 
                                                 
1
 Almost all central banks today conduct monetary policy by pegging nominal interest rates rather than by setting 
levels of monetary aggregates. 
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we want to study IT without having to worry about the complex issues of handling output gap.  
We can do so theoretically by using a flexible-price general equilibrium model.  If the price level 
is perfectly flexible to move the economy immediately to equilibrium, then there never is any 
output gap.  As a result, this paper studies IT in the context of a flexible-price general 
equilibrium model, not because we believe the price level is in fact that flexible, but rather so we 
can concentrate on the issue of price determinacy without being distracted by issues involving 
output gap. 
A necessary though not sufficient condition for a system of equations to determine the 
unknowns of the system is that the number of equations be no less than the number of unknowns.  
Therefore, if the number of equations in a system is less than the number of unknowns, we know 
that we cannot determine all the values of the unknowns; in other words, some of the unknowns 
will be indeterminate. 
Most of the previous literature on the price-determinacy of IT has concluded that IT does 
determine prices when the central bank follows a Taylor-like feedback rule for setting interest 
rates (e.g., Woodford, 2003, and Dittmar and Gavin, 2005).  However, the previous studies of the 
price determinacy of IT have utilized infinite-horizon economic models.  In his infinite-horizon 
model, Woodford (2003, p. 73) states, “I then have a system of two equations at each date, (1.15) 
and (1.21), to determine the two endogenous variables Pt and it ...”  All that Woodford’s 
statement means is there exists a one-to-one correspondence between the equations and the 
unknowns in his infinite-horizon economy.  Most mathematicians should react to Woodford’s 
statement with grave suspect as that statement is meaningless when time is infinite.  
Mathematicians will remember Galileo’s establishing a one-to-one correspondence between the 
positive integers and their squares even though the set of squares is a proper subset of the 
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positive integers.2  Mathematicians will also remember the errors that other people have made 
when working with infinity.  For example, applying the associative law of addition with respect 
to the infinite sequence 1-1+1-1+1-1… would erroneously lead to the conclusion that 0=1 (See 
Clegg, 2003). 
This paper takes an approach that avoids any possibility of making logical errors 
involving infinity.  This paper studies an economy with an arbitrarily large, but finite horizon 
and then takes the limit as that finite horizon goes to infinity.  With a finite horizon, we can 
count the number of equations and unknowns to determine whether all the unknown price levels 
can be determined. 
By carefully counting equations and unknowns, this paper reaches a conclusion that is in 
stark contrast to the existing literature.  We find that the current price level cannot be determined 
in a finite-horizon model under IT when the central bank pegs the nominal interest rate.  In the 
situations where we do find an equation containing the current inflation rate, we find only one 
such equation.  That equation, which is the same whether the economy has a finite or infinite-
horizon, reflects the central bank looking at the current inflation rate when it pegs the nominal 
interest rate.  This paper argues that it is absurd to think that a mechanism where the current 
inflation rate affects the nominal interest rate is the mechanism that determines the price level. 
The outline of the rest of this paper is as follows:  Using a finite-horizon economic 
model, Section II presents the Fisher-Euler equation that is the basis for the price-determinacy 
literature.  Then for a finite economy, section III analyzes PLT while Section IV analyzes “past 
IT.”  Section V extends the analysis to cover “current IT” and “expected IT”.  Section VI tries to 
anticipate some possible counterarguments and rebuts those counterarguments.  Section VII 
invalidates the non-explosive criterion, which the previous price-determinacy literature has used 
                                                 
2
 See Clegg (2003). 
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as the basis for their analysis and conclusions. Section VIII summarizes this paper’s conclusions 
and explains intuitively why IT does not determine the current price level. 
 
II. The Fisher-Euler Equation 
 The price-determinacy literature primarily depends on two equations – the Fisher-Euler 
equation and a policy feedback rule.  For a representative consumer without utility shocks, the 
Fisher-Euler equation states 
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where β is the time discount factor. As does Carlstrom and Freust (2001), we define Rt to be the 
gross nominal interest rate from time t to time t+1.  The gross nominal interest rate equals one 
plus the nominal interest rate. The Fisher-Euler equation (1) states that the marginal utility per 
“buck” today equals today’s gross nominal interest rate times the expected marginal utility per 
“buck” tomorrow. 3 
 One rational-expectations model that leads to (1) is the following: Assume a 
representative consumer4 who maximizes 
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ttt cPM ≥  (3) 
                                                 
3
 Carlstrom and Fuerst (2001) argue that (4) only applies for what they call CWID timing.  However, for a CIA 
constraint where no money is held from one period to the next; (1) does apply.  
4
 Just because I am using a representative consumer in this paper’s model, does not mean that I condone its use.  As 
Eagle and Domian (2005) show, having diverse consumers even with “aggregatable” utility functions gives a much 
more rich sense of the Pareto-efficiency involving those economies. 
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where (3) and (4) hold for t=0,1,2,…T; and Mt is the money held at the beginning of the period, 
Bt is the amount of one-period bonds, and yt is the representative consumer’s endowment at 
time t.  Equation (3) is a cash-in-advance (CIA) constraint and 111 −−− − ttt cPM  is the amount of 
money held from period t-1 to period t.  When the nominal interest rate is always positive, which 
means Rt >1 for all t, the CIA constraint (3) holds with equality which implies that (4) can be 
written as: 
11 −−+=+ ttttttt RByPBcP  (5) 
It is relatively elementary to maximize (2) with respect to (5) to get (1) as the first order 
condition. 
 Equation (1) can be justified in other ways as well such as including money in the utility 
function.5  Also, Woodford (2003, p. 71) derives his equation (1.21), which is the same as (1) 
except that he includes utility shocks. 
As is often done in the price-determinacy literature, assume a pure exchange economy 
without storage.  Where Yt is the aggregate endowment, this implies that ct=Yt.  Also, for the sake 
of mathematical simplicity, assume that the representative consumer knows the future aggregate 
endowments.  Then (1) can be transformed into the following: 
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When the central bank pegs Rt, equation (6) represents one of the mechanisms by which 
the current price level would be determined, if it is determined.  If 
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 See Carlstrum and Fruest (2001). 
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(6) will determine Pt.  See Eagle (2005b) for an explanation how (6) reflects 
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together affecting nominal aggregate demand which then affects the price level. 
III. PLT in a Finite-Horizon Economy 
With a system consisting of a finite number of equations and unknowns, we know that if 
the number of equations is less than the number of unknowns, then it is impossible to determine 
values for all the unknowns.  In such a situation, we say that some of the unknowns are 
indeterminate. However, with infinity, such simplicity is lost.  For example, if we have a 
sequence of systems of n equations with n+1 unknowns for n=1,2,3,…; then each finite system is 
indeterminate.  However, in the limit as n goes to infinity, both the number of equations and the 
number of unknowns go to infinity.  In fact, in the limit there is a one-to-one correspondence 
between the equations and the unknowns.  With an infinite number of equations and unknowns, 
we no longer can compare the number of equations with the number of unknowns. 
Contrary to the way most economists think about such a sum, mathematicians define 

∞→
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0
.  In this paper, we take a similar approach to address the issue of the price 
determinacy.  While the previous literature has assumed the economy lasts forever, we study a 
rational expectations economy with a finite but arbitrarily large horizon.  Let T be this finite 
horizon.  We can then study the limit of this economy as T goes to infinity. 
The Fisher-Euler equation (1) and hence (6) then apply for periods 0,1,2,…,T-1.  These 
equations do not apply for period T because there is no period T+1 for loans to be paid back.  As 
a result, at time T there are no new loans or bonds and hence no interest rate. 
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We now discuss price-level targeting (PLT) so that we can see a situation where the price 
level is (technically) determined.  Under PLT, the central bank has price-level targets for each 
period, which it makes transparent to the general public.  Following the symbolization of 
Woodford (2003), define *tP  to be the central bank’s price-level target for time t.  Following 
Bellman’s Principle, we start our analysis at time T and work backwards.  At time T, there is no 
interest rate, and therefore the central bank must set the money supply to achieve its price-level 
target.  Under the assumption of the CIA constraint, the central bank will set TTT YPM *=  (Note: 
because there is no tomorrow, consumers will spend all the money they have at time T). This 
combined with cT=YT  and the CIA constraint (3) holding with equality implies that *TT PP = . 
Assume that for periods t=0,1,…,T-1; the central bank pegs the gross nominal interest 
rate according to the following McCallum-Woodford feedback rule:6 
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where τ >0 is a parameter that reflects how sensitive this rule is to situations where the expected 
value of next year’s price level differs from its target. Note that (7) is written in the spirit of 
Carlstrom and Fruest (2001) except that I write it in terms of the price-level targets instead of 
some steady state.  Also, note that when 
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E =1, we will say that the expected price level 
next period is “on target”.  Equation (7) is an “expected PLT” rule.  After we discuss expected 
PLT, we will then study “current PLT” and “past PLT.” 
 Substituting (7) into (6) gives: 
                                                 
6
 The current PLT version of this policy rule was initially proposed by McCallum (1981), but has more recently 
been discussed by Woodford (2003, pp. 74-85). 
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which applies for t=0,1,2,…,T-1.  Remembering that the central bank sets the money supply at 
time T to achieve *TT PP = , (8) implies that * 11 −− = TT PP .  By backwards recursion, we conclude 
that *tt PP =  for t=0,1,2,…,T.  This means that the price level is technically determined in this 
model under PLT regardless how large, but finite, T is.  Hence, we conclude that in the limit as T 
goes to infinity, the price-level is technically determined. 
 In this specific model, the actual price levels for all t are determined.  In general, it should 
be noted that for price determinacy, only P0 needs to be determined where 0 denotes the current 
period.  However, for P0 to be determined in a rational expectations model under PLT, all the 
expected values of future prices must in some sense be determined as well.7 
 When the central bank pegs Rt, equation (8) reflects the two mechanisms by which the 
current price is determined.  Since 
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determined, then Pt will be determined.  The “1” in the exponent of (8) reflects the mechanism of 
the Fisher-Euler equation (6) by which 
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E  affects Pt.  The “-τ” in the exponent of (8) 
reflects the mechanism in the feedback rule (7) by which 
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E  affects Rt, which in turn 
affects Pt in the Fisher-Euler equation (6).  If we take expectations at time s of (8) for s<t, we get 
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 For a relatively simple model, the “in some sense” may mean that E0[1/t] be determined for all t; for other more 
complex models, it may mean that more complex moments or expectations involving t will need to be determined. 
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 If we solve (8) using backwards recursion, we get 
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τ =0 then Pt depends very strongly on 
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E 1  in the sense discussed by Sargent and Wallace 
(1975, p. 250).  If τ >0, this dependence is diminished as T-t goes to infinity.  The previous 
price-determinacy literature such as Woodford (2003, p. 82) has argued that the price level in an 
infinitely-lived economy is determined only if 0>τ .8  Eagle (2005a) and Eagle (2007) show 
that, if the public is no longer certain the central bank will meet its price-level target at time T, 
then a similar conclusion holds for PLT in a finite-horizon economy. 
In addition to expected PLT, there are two other forms of PLT discussed in the literature 
– “past PLT” and “current PLT.”  Instead of (7), a central bank following past PLT will peg the 
gross nominal interest rate according to the following feedback rule: 
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where τ >0 is a parameter that reflects how sensitive this rule is to situations where last period’s 
price level differs from its target. 
 Substituting (9) into (6) gives: 
τ−
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which applies for t=0,1,2,…,T-1. 
Solving for the price levels under past PLT is considerably more complex than under 
expected PLT.  However, the price level is determined under past PLT.  Since our discussion of 
past PLT is really just a side note, I will now just give the solution without proof.9  Define 
ττ =)1,(z  and )1,(1),( −+= szsz τ
τ
τ  for s=2, 3, … .  Then the solution to (10) is: 
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 for t=0,l,2,…,T-1. 
Also *TT PP =  because at time T the central bank sets the money supply so to achieve this price 
level.  Note that if *11 −− = PP , then the solution is that 
*
tt PP =  for t=0,1,…,T. 
 Still another form of PLT in the literature is “current PLT.”  Under “current PLT” the 
central bank uses the following “feedback rule” when it pegs the gross nominal interest rate: 
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where τ >0 is a parameter that reflects how sensitive this rule is to situations this period’s price 
level differs from its target. 
 Substituting (11) into (6) gives: 
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Applying Bellman’s principle and working backwards, we first get that *TT PP =  because the 
central bank at time T sets the money supply so to meet its price-level target.  Substituting this 
                                                                                                                                                             
8
 See Woodford (2003, p. 82). 
9
 This can be proven using recursive methods. 
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result into (12) applied at time t=T-1 shows that * 11 −− = TT PP .  By backwards recursion, we 
conclude that *tt PP =  for t=0,1,2,…,T. 
 Much of the previous literature that does study PLT such as Woodford (2003) uses 
“current PLT.”  However, I argue that “current PLT” does not make logical sense in a flexible-
price model.  The way that Woodford discusses the current-PLT “feedback” rule (12) is that the 
central bank looks at the current price level when it sets the gross nominal interest rate.  For this 
to make sense as a feedback rule, the current price level must be predetermined when the central 
bank pegs the current period’s gross nominal interest rate.  However, if we study (6) carefully, 
we find that if Rt changes then Pt must change.  Therefore, Pt cannot be determined prior to the 
central bank pegging Rt. 
 An advantage of a finite-horizon model is we can use very simple examples to illustrate 
certain points such as the point that the current price level cannot be predetermined when the 
central bank pegs the gross nominal interest rate.  Assume T=1, Y0=Y1=100, 0.1*1
*
0 == PP , and 
β=0.99.  Then the central bank at time t=1 will set the money supply equal to 100, which will 
cause P1=1.0.  Putting this and the other values of this example into (6) evaluated at t=0 gives 
0
0
99.01 R
P
= .  This clearly shows that the current price level depends on the gross nominal 
interest rate set by the central bank.  If the central bank sets R0=1/0.99, then P0 would equal 1.0.  
On the other hand if the central bank sets R0=1.0, then P0 would equal 1/0.99.  Similarly, if the 
central bank sets R0=1/0.992, then P0 would equal 0.99.  Since P0 changes when R0 changes,. the 
central bank cannot treat P0 as given when it pegs R0.  More generally, for t=0,1,…,T-1, the 
central bank cannot treat Pt as given when it pegs Rt. 
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 This argument that (12) cannot be viewed as a feedback rule is important to IT because 
“current IT” faces this same issue.  If the central bank cannot treat Pt as given under current PLT 
when it pegs Rt, then it cannot treat pit as given under current IT when it pegs Rt. 
IV. IT in a Finite-Horizon Economy 
 In this section, we analyze inflation targeting (IT) in an economy with a finite horizon.  
By carefully counting the number of equations and unknowns, we find that the price level is not 
determined under IT when the central bank pegs the nominal interest rate.  In some situations, no 
equation exists that includes the current inflation rate, which means that there is no equation and 
hence no mechanism by which the current price level could be determined.  Even when an 
equation does contain the current inflation rate, it represents how the current inflation rate affects 
the central bank setting the nominal interest rate, not a mechanism that can determine the current 
inflation rate, not a mechanism that can determine the current price level. 
To simplify the analysis, the price-determinacy literature defines the inflation rate as 
1−
≡
t
t
t P
P
pi .  Under IT, the central bank makes its inflation targets transparent to the general 
public.  Define *tpi  to be the central bank’s target for the inflation rate at time t.  Under IT, the 
central bank at time T will set the money supply so to achieve its targeted inflation rate *Tpi .  
Therefore, the central bank will set TTTT YPM *1pi−= .  This combined with the CIA constraint (3) 
holding with equality and cT =YT implies that: 
*
TT pipi = . (13) 
 At time T-1, assume the central bank will set the nominal interest rate equal to 
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Substituting this into (6) and remembering that 1/ −≡ TTT PPpi gives  
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Note that (15) only involves piT and is consistent with (13). 
 At time t=0,1,2,…,T-2; assume the central bank follows the following feedback rule 
when it pegs the gross nominal interest rate: 
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where τ >0 is the sensitivity of this feedback rule to when the past inflation rate differs from the 
central bank’s targeted inflation rate.  Equation (12) is called “past inflation targeting.”  We will 
discuss “current IT” and “expected IT” in the next section. 
Substituting (16) into (6) gives  
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which applies for t=0,1,2,…,T-2.  Please note that if we had made (16) and (17) apply to time 
t=T-1, we would then have been inconsistent with (13) whenever 1−Tpi  differs from * 1−Tpi .  That is 
why for t=T-1, we assume that (14) and (15) apply instead of (16) and (17).10 
 We are now ready to count equations and unknowns.  Our system of equations consists of 
(17), (13), and (15).  Equation (17) represents T-1 equations since (17) applies to t=0,1,2,…,T-2.  
Adding equations (13) and (15) to these T-1 equations from (17) gives T+1 equations.  The 
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unknowns in these T-1 equations are tpi  or expected values involving tpi  for t=0,1,…,T; which 
means that at a minimum11 there are T+1 unknowns. Therefore, we do have an equal number of 
equations and unknowns (if the minimum number of unknowns applies), which is a necessary 
though not sufficient condition for those unknowns being determined. 
When we look closer, however, we find that two of these equations, (13) and (15), only 
involve Tpi  or its target and hence neither (13) nor (15) can determine anything other than Tpi .  
This implies that there are only T-1 equations that are available to determine unknowns that do 
not involve Tpi ; these T-1 equations are (17) for t=0,1,…,T-2.  Since there are only T-1 
equations to determine the T unknowns other than Tpi , we are unable to determine all the 
unknowns other than Tpi .  In fact, 0pi  is indeterminate.  Since 100 / −= PPpi , this means that P0 is 
indeterminate.  In summary, IT leads to price indeterminacy in a finite-horizon economy.  
The only equation containing 0pi  is (17) evaluated at t=1, which is given below: 
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Note that if T<3, then even (18) does not apply since (17) only applies for t=0,1,…,T-2.  Hence, 
if T<3, there is no equation containing pi0 and therefore no mechanism to determine pi0 or P0. 
 Now consider T ≥ 3.  Remember that we derived (17) by substituting the “past IT” rule, 
equation (16), into (6).  Since there is no 0pi  in (6) evaluated for t=0, the 0pi  in (18) must come 
from (16) evaluated for t=0, which is 
                                                                                                                                                             
10
 An alternative formulation is to assume that (16) and (17) do apply to time t=T-1 instead of (14) and (15), but that 
the central bank then targets sets the money supply at time T to be consistent with (17).  This change will not affect 
the price indeterminacy of IT. 
11
 We use the word “minimum” here because there more be more than one unknown moment or expected value 
involving pit for each t. 
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However, (19) represents how the current inflation rate affects how the central bank pegs next 
period’s nominal interest rate.  Unless you believe in time travel, such a relationship cannot 
represent the mechanism that determines the current inflation rate. 
Even with an infinite horizon, (19) is the only equation containing the current inflation 
rate.  If we agree that (19) does not represent a mechanism by which either the current inflation 
rate or the current price level can be determined, we then must conclude that regardless whether 
the horizon is finite or infinite, IT does not determine the current price level. 
 Because this paper’s conclusion is so at odds with the previous literature on the price 
determinacy of IT, we next discuss some specific examples to help increase the likelihood that 
readers will realize the price indeterminacy of IT in finite-horizon economies.  For these 
examples, assume that *tpi = 1−pi =1.02 for all t.  Also, assume that P-1=1.0.  We will now look at 
specific values for the finite horizon T: 
 First assume that T=1.  Including the inflation rate at time T=1, we have two unknowns -- 
pi0 and pi1.  Since T-2=-1, (16) does not apply at all.  Therefore, only equations (13) and (15) 
apply.  Equation (13) implies that *11 pipi = =1.02.  This conclusion is consistent with equation 
(15).  Since (13) and (15) only involve pi1, there is no equation that determines pi0.  Since 
pi0=P0/P1, this means there is no equation to determine P0.  Hence, the current price level is 
indeterminate.  This indeterminacy means there are an uncountably infinite number of solutions 
to this system of equations.  One such example is P0=1.02, P1=1.022.  A second such example is 
P0=1.0 P1=1.02.  A third such example is P0=1.05, P1=1.02(1.05).  Again, there is no equation to 
determine the current price level. 
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 Next, assume that T=2.  Equation (13) implies that *22 pipi = =1.02 which is consistent 
with equation (15).  Equation (17) applied to t=0 states that 
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assumed that *11 −− = pipi =1.02, this implies that 02.1
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E .  Thus, this expected value of 
1/pi1 is determined.  However, once again, there is no equation to determine pi0 or P0, which 
means the current price level is again indeterminate. 
Next, assume that T=3.  Equation (13) implies that *33 pipi = =1.02, which is consistent 
with (15).  Equation (17) applied for t=0 gives 
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E .  Equation (17) applied for t=1 gives (18), which includes two unknowns, 
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1
pi
E  and pi0.  Since (17) does not apply for t>1, (18) is the only equation to determine these 
unknowns, but it impossible for (18) to do so by itself.  Hence, these two unknowns are 
indeterminate.  Since pi0 is indeterminate so is P0. 
V. “Current IT”, and Expected IT 
 The previous section showed that price indeterminacy results when the central bank 
follows a past-IT feedback rule as it pegs the nominal interest rate.  This section shows that price 
indeterminacy also occurs under “current IT” and expected IT.  First, we will look at expected 
IT, where the central bank sets the gross nominal interest rate according to the following 
feedback rule for t=0,1,…,T-1: 
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where τ >0 is the sensitivity of the gross nominal interest rate to when the expected inflation rate 
differs from its target. 
 Substituting (20) into (6) gives 
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 The system of equations under current IT consists of (13) for time t=T and (21) for times 
t=0,1,2,…,T-1.  This is a total of T+1 equations to determine the T+1 unknowns, which are pit for 
t=0,1,2,…,T.  However, both (13) and (21) for t=T-1 only include Tpi .  Therefore, there are only 
T-1 equations available to determine the T unknowns other than Tpi .  These T-1 equations are 
(21) for t=0,1,2,…,T-2.  The T unknowns other than Tpi  are pit for t=0,1,2,…,T.  Therefore, there 
are too few equations to determine the unknowns of this system other than Tpi . 
Since (21) applies for t=0,1,2,…,T-1; we should note that there is no equation that 
contains pi0.  Therefore, regardless how large T is, there is no equation and hence no mechanism 
by which either pi0 or P0 could be determined.  Therefore, the current price level is indeterminate 
under expected IT. 
Next, consider “current IT,” which is the form of IT that is most commonly studied in the 
previous price-determinacy literature (See for example, Woodford, 2003).  Under “current IT”, 
the central bank sets the gross nominal interest for periods t=0,1,2,…,T-2, equal to 
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Substituting (22) into (6) gives 
τ
pi
pi
pi
pi

	





=





+
+
t
t
t
t
tE
*
1
*
1
 (23) 
where τ >0 is the sensitivity of the gross nominal interest rate to how the current inflation rate 
compares to its target.  Equation (23) applies for t=0,1,2,…,T-2 since (22) applies for 
t=0,1,2,…,T-2.  We are assuming that the central bank sets RT-1 according to (14) which means 
(15) applies for t=T-1 in order to be consistent with the central bank setting STM   so that 
*
TT pipi = .  Note that (23) and hence (22) applied to t=T-1 would not have this consistency when 
*
11 −− ≠ TT pipi . 
 We are now ready to count equations and unknowns.  The system of equations consists of 
(13), (15), and (23) where (23) is for t=0,1,…,T-2.  Since (13) and (15) only involve piT or its 
target, again it is useful to count the unknowns other than piT and equations that are available to 
help determine the unknowns other than piT. 
 The unknowns other than piT are pit for t=0,1,2,…,T-1.  Therefore, other than piT there are 
T unknowns.  The only equations available to determine these unknowns other than piT are (23) 
for t=0,1,2,…,T-2.  Therefore, there are only T-1 equations available to determine the T 
unknowns other than piT.  Therefore, even under current IT, the price level is indeterminate. 
 The only equation that contains the current inflation rate is (23) evaluated at t=0 which is 
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tE .  Even with an infinite-horizon economy, this still would be the only equation 
containing the current inflation rate.  Remember that (23) was derived by substituting (22) into 
(6).  Since (6) evaluated at t=0 does not include the current inflation rate, the pi0 in (23) must 
come from (22) evaluated at t=0, which is 
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The previous literature discussing “current IT” (e.g., Woodford, 2003) describes equation 
(24) as a feedback rule by which the central bank looks at the current inflation rate when it sets 
the current gross nominal interest rate.  However, equation (24) cannot be the mechanism by 
which determines the current price level because (24) is a process by which the current price 
level affects an action, not a process by which demand and supply and equilibrating forces affect 
the price level. 
This absurdity of “current IT” is even greater because “current IT” does not make sense 
in a flexible-price model for the same reasons that “current PLT” does not make sense.  When 
we earlier discussed “current PLT”, we noted that (6) implies that Pt depends on the value of Rt.  
If Rt increases (decreases), then Pt must decrease (increase).  Since 1/ −≡ ttt PPpi , this also means 
that pit depends on the value of Rt.  If Rt increases (decreases), then pit must decrease (increase).  
Therefore, the central bank cannot take pit as predetermined when it pegs Rt.  Hence, (22) does 
not make sense as a feedback rule, which means that “current IT” does not make sense. 
 
VI. Rebuttal to Possible Counterarguments 
Many economists involved in the price-determinacy literature at this point of the paper 
are likely to have reasons for which they are unwilling to accept that IT leads to price 
indeterminacy.  In this section, I try to anticipate and rebuff those counterarguments. 
One counterargument that many economists will level against this paper is that they will 
argue against assuming a finite-horizon economy.  My rebuttal is that we are able to assume an 
arbitrarily large finite horizon and we are able to study the limit as that finite horizon goes to 
- 23 - 
infinity.  The alternative is to assume an infinite-horizon economy, where we are unable to 
compare an infinite number of equations to an infinite number of unknowns, and where it is very 
easy to make mathematical errors concerning infinity.  Also, as Eagle (2007) shows, the non-
explosive criterion is invalid; this non-explosive criterion is what the previous price-determinacy 
literature has used in its analysis. 
Furthermore, even if we do consider infinite-horizon economies, the only equation that 
includes 0pi  is where the central bank looks at  0pi  when it sets the nominal interest rate.  Since 
the direction of causality in that equation is from 0pi  to the nominal interest rate, this equation 
cannot be the basis for the determination of 0pi  even in an economy with an infinite horizon. 
A second possible counterargument some economists might level against this paper is 
that I did not conform enough to the previous price-determinacy literature.  While the Fisher-
Euler equations (1) and (6) and the feedback rules for the central bank setting the nominal 
interest rates are similar to those in the previous literature, this paper did not address the steady-
state solution, nor did it do a log-linear approximation.  The reason is that this paper did not need 
to do so.  Because this paper (i) states the feedback rules in terms of the targeted inflation rates 
(or targeted price levels under PLT) rather than the steady-state inflation rate and (ii) is willing to 
work with expected values of the reciprocal of inflation rates; there is no need to work with 
steady-state solutions or with log-linear approximations.  In other words, this paper has 
discovered innovations that are more general and more precise than the previous literature.  
Economists should consider these innovations as positive contributions to the literature, not as 
reasons to reject this paper’s arguments. 
A third possible counterargument that I anticipate might be stated as, “The author 
neglected to consider the fact that last year, the Fisher-Euler equation applied for time t = -1.  
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When we consider that, then we do have enough equations to determine the unknowns.  When 
we go back far enough, we will also have other equations the contain 0.”  This counterargument 
confuses the determinacy of an expected value involving 0 with the determinacy of the realized 
value of 0.  Going back in time does not affect the price-indeterminacy of inflation targeting.  
While it is true that by going back to time t = -1 does result in 
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certain sense, that does not help determine the actual realized value of 0. 
In all three types of IT – past IT, current IT, and expected IT – the 
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just because 
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E  is in some sense “determined” by the equations does not mean that the 
realized value of 0 is determined. 
Once again, we can use the simplicity allowed in a finite horizon model to demonstrate 
that 0 and hence P0 is not determined even though 
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−
0
1
1
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E  is in some sense “determined”.  
Assume that *22 −− = pipi  and *11 −− = pipi .  Then *
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E  regardless whether the central bank 
follows past IT, current IT, or expected IT.  Let us further assume that 02.1*0 =pi  so that 
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E  does not determine 0, consider the possibility 
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that there are five possible values for 0: 0.98/1.02, 0.99/1.02, 1/1.02, 1.01/1.02, and 1.02/1.02.  
If these five possible values are equally likely, then the average of these solutions would be 
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E .  Thus, this example shows how multiple solutions could exist, yet 
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could still equal a constant “predetermined” value.  Hopefully, this example makes it clear that 
just because an equation “determines” 
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1
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pi
E  does not mean that 0 is determined. 
Technically speaking, this is more complicated than the above paragraph indicates 
because the expectation of an indeterminate variable does not exist.  If a model does not 
determine a variable Xt at time t, then there is no Et-1[Xt].  With regard to IT, if 0 is not 
determined, then there are no probabilities associated with all the possible solutions.  Even if the 
number of solutions was finite, there would be no mechanism to assign probabilities to the 
different solutions.   Hence, if the value of 0 is indeterminate, then 





−
0
1
1
pi
E  cannot really exist.  
We should realize that when we write down 





+1
1
t
t P
E  in the Fisher-Euler equation, we were 
assuming that expected value existed.  When we do make that assumption, we need to later go 
back and check to see if that assumption really is true.  If Pt+1 is not determined at time t+1 under 
any realization, then that previous expectations of Pt+1 could not have existed. 
 
VII. The Inapplicability of the Non-Explosive Criterion 
The price-determinacy literature has relied on what Eagle (2007) calls the “non-explosive 
criterion” as the basis for its claim that IT determines the current price level.  The non-explosive 
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criterion, which came from Sargent (1979) and Blanchard and Kahn (1980), was developed to 
eliminate speculative bubbles in rational expectations models.  While it does eliminate 
speculative bubbles, it also eliminates other explosive price behavior that is caused by 
fundamental variables.  This is bad enough, but the price-determinacy literature has taken this to 
its absurd extreme by making the fundamental variables endogenous in such a way to “cause” 
explosive behavior for all but one solution.  By applying the non-explosive criterion, the 
previous price-determinacy literature has claimed that the only legitimate solution is the unique 
non-exploding solution. 
McCallum (1999) criticizes the non-explosive criterion, which he refers to as the stability 
criterion:  “…one important objective of dynamic economic analysis … will often be to 
determine the conditions under which a system will be dynamically stable and unstable.  … To 
the extent, then, that this objective of analysis is important, the stability criterion is inherently 
unsuitable.”  This paper’s critique of the non-explosive criterion is related to McCallum’s 
critique. 
Eagle (2007) discusses more about the problems with the non-explosive criterion.  For 
this paper, I will just show examples where the non-explosive criterion does not apply.  Since the 
non-explosive criterion does not universally apply, these examples meet my burden of proof to 
dispose of the non-explosive criterion as a legitimate argument that prices are determined under 
IT.  It is the burden of the proof of the previous price-determinacy literature to show that the 
non-explosive criterion does apply to their analyses; so far that literature has not met that burden 
of proof and Cochrane (2006) gives reasons why that literature will probably be unable to meet 
that burden of proof. 
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The simplest example is  a one-dimensional trajectory.  Imagine a ship traveling in a 
frictionless one-dimensional space, without any fuel, and with an unknown speed.  The equations 
describing its motion are: 
)( 011 xxxx tt −+= −  (25) 
where xt is the location of the ship at time t and T is the time horizon, which could be finite or 
infinite.  Equation (25) applies for t=2,3,…,T  so there are T-1 equations.  The ship’s current 
location x0 is known, but its speed is not.  Therefore, the unknowns are xt for t=1,2,…,T so there 
are T unknowns.  If T is finite, then the T-1 equations are less than the T unknowns.  As a result 
the system is indeterminate; the unknowns are indeterminate.  Because we do not know the speed 
at which the ship is traveling, we cannot determine its future locations. 
Now, let us consider T being infinite.  I consider it obvious to physicists, mathematicians, 
and economists that even with an infinite time horizon the system is indeterminate; if we do not 
know the speed that the ship is traveling, then we cannot determine the future locations of the 
ship.  In order for me to show that the non-explosive criterion is logically defective, all I need to 
show is one example where the non-explosive criterion leads to an incorrect conclusion.  
Therefore, assume that the targeted path for this ship over time is given by tsxxt ⋅+=
*
0
*
 where 
*
tx  is the targeted location of the ship at time t and  s* is the desired speed for the ship.  Define 
*
tt xx −  to be the measure of the targeting error.  Of course, since the ship has no fuel, the 
captain of the ship has no control over whether or not the ship will meet this target.  All the 
captain can do is to formulate a target and just hope the ship will meet it. 
 Sargent’s (1979) version of the non-exploding criterion is to assume that the solution is 
bounded.  If we define the solution in terms of the measurement error, we would conclude that 
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all solutions of  *tt xx −  are unbounded except the one solution where *tt xx − =0 which is 
where *tt xx =  for all t.  If we used Sargent’s version of the non-explosive criterion to insist that 
the only legitimate solution is this unique bounded solution, we would conclude that the ship will 
be forever on target even though we do not know the ship’s current speed and we have no means 
by which to affect the speed of the ship.  Such a conclusion is absurd.  This therefore shows that 
Sargent’s bounded assumption does not universally apply. 
McCallum (1999) also includes the restrictions of Blanchard and Kahn (1982) as part of 
the non-explosive criterion.  Blanchard and Kahn do allow unbounded solutions, but they restrict 
how fast something can increase or decrease.  In essence their restrictions only allow less-than 
exponential growth which implies that these restrictions rule out speculative bubbles. 
We will now show that the Blanchard and Kahn restrictions do not universally apply.  
Again imagine a ship traveling through a one-dimension frictional space, but now this ship has a 
cruise control that changes the speed according to the following: 
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 (26) 
where st is the speed of the vehicle at time t and *s  is the vehicle’s targeted speed, which we 
assume to be constant.  Since, we assume that the current speed (s0) is unknown, but that the 
cruise control will observe s0 and use it to set s1 according to (26).  Therefore, (26) applies for 
t=1, 2, 3,…,T where T can be either a finite horizon or infinity.  Therefore, there are T equations 
in our system.  The unknowns are st for t=0,1,2,…,T; which means there are T+1 unknowns..  If 
T is finite, then since there are only T equations and T+1 unknowns, the system is indeterminate.  
We cannot determine the speeds of the ship through time.  In summary, if we do not know the 
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current speed, we then cannot determine the future speeds of this ship with its cruise control.  
(However, if τ >0, the limit of the speed as T goes to infinity would equal s*.)   
 Now let us consider T as infinity.  Again, it should be obvious to physicists, 
mathematicians, and economists that if we do not know the current speed, then we will be unable 
to determine future speeds through equation (26).  We will now show that applying the 
Blanchard and Kahn (1980) restrictions to this example does result in a contradiction to this 
obvious statement.  To do so, note that we can rewrite (26) as 
τ+
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, which we could 
solve backwards recursively to get 
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Note that 
1−t
t
s
s
 is a measure of acceleration.  If τ < 0 then the ship will decelerate when s0 > s* 
and accelerate when s0 < s*.  While this is how a normal cruise control works, there would be an 
infinite number of solutions that meet the Blanchard and Kahn restrictions. 
However, if τ > 0, then the speed will accelerate when s0 > s* and decelerate when s0 < s*.  
This is the opposite of how a cruise control.  However, as seen in (27), if τ > 0 the acceleration 
increases exponentially when s0 > s* and decreases exponentially when s0 < s*.  Therefore, when 
τ > 0, there is only one solution that meets the Blanchard and Kahn (1980) restrictions and that is 
where s0=s*.  Therefore, if the Blanchard and Kahn restrictions were universally applicable, then 
that would mean that we should design cruise controls to speed up when a vehicle goes too fast 
and to slow down when a vehicle goes too slow.  It would also mean that we would not have to 
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know the initial speed to determine the speed the vehicle travels.  Both conclusions are absurd, 
which means that the Blanchard and Kahn restrictions are not universally applicable. 
In order that the length of this paper be finite, I need to ask that the reader properly 
distribute burdens of proof according to normal academic standards.  I have met my burden of 
proof by showing that the non-explosive criterion is not universally applicable.  Therefore, in this 
debate, those who have based their conclusions on the non-explosive criterion now have the 
burden of proof to show that the non-explosive criterion does apply to their analysis.  The 
previous price-determinacy literature has not done that.  For example, not only does Woodford 
(2003) fail to meet that burden of proof, but he lacks any citation of why he assumes his solution 
must be bounded.  The situation has been made worse by Woodford’s refusal to respond to my 
requests for information on this issue.   I have repeatedly tried contacting Woodford by email, by 
phone, and by formal letter, asking him to tell me his basis for assuming his solution is bounded.  
Over the last three years, he has never responded to my requests for this information.   
That some journals have been letting specific literatures determine whether a paper is 
accepted or rejected has caused these journals to stray from normal burdens of proof.  For 
example, one journal rejected a critique12 I have written on Woodford (2003) because the referee 
stated that there did exist some literature not cited by Woodford that did justify Woodford 
assuming that his solution was bounded.  The literature the anonymous referee cited included 
Lucas (1978), Calin, Chen, Cosimano and Himonas (2005), and Altug and Labadie (1994, 
Chapter 5).  In fact, none of this literature applies since the assumptions of those models differ 
substantially from Woodford’s model.  In particular, Lucas (1978) did not even have money in 
his economy.  Neither did Calin, Chen, Cosimano and Himonas (2005) as their work was an 
extension of Lucas (1978).  While Altug and Labadie (1994, Chapter 5) did include money, they 
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assumed upper bonds to the growth rate of the money supply.  Those upper bounds do not apply 
to Woodford’s model when the central bank pegs the nominal interest rate rather than setting the 
money supply. 
By accepting the referee’s rejection recommendation and refusing to respond to my 
rebuttal letter, this journal has shifted an important burden of proof from Woodford to me, the 
challenger.  Rather than requiring Woodford to cite the basis for his assuming a bounded solution 
and to prove that it does apply to his model, the journal in effect expected me to show that there 
did not exist any literature that supports Woodford making this bounded assumption.  Such an 
expectation of a challenger in essence helps protect Woodford from legitimate logical 
challenges.  In economics as in any academic discipline, we want to encourage critical thinking.  
To do so, someone reading an article that does not make logical sense should be able to logically 
challenge the steps of a theory by reviewing the cited basis for those steps in the paper; the 
challenger should not be required to read all possible literature that is relevant to the theory 
before making such a logical challenge.  All this means is that journals need to follow what 
should be considered the normal academic distribution of burdens of proof.  To do that, the 
journals need to police the referees to make sure that their recommendations are not based on an 
improper distribution of burden of proofs. 
 
VIII. Conclusions and Reflections 
 The previous literature on the price-determinacy of IT such as Woodford (2003) has used 
the non-explosive criterion to conclude that IT determines the current price level.  However, this 
paper shows that the non-explosive criterion does not apply universally.  In particular, if we 
                                                                                                                                                             
12
 See Eagle (2005c) 
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applied the non-explosive criterion to a cruise control, then we would reach the absurd 
conclusion that the control should cause the vehicle to accelerate when it is going too fast and to 
slow down when it is going too slow. 
 Because the non-explosive criterion does not universally apply, and because the previous 
price-determinacy literature such as Woodford (2003) has not formally justified why the non-
explosive criterion applies to IT, this paper challenges that literature to complete its burden of 
proof, to show that the non-explosive criterion does apply to their analysis.  In the meantime, this 
paper has avoided logical errors involving infinity by analyzing IT in an economy with an 
arbitrarily large but finite time horizon.  In stark contrast to the previous literature, when the 
central bank pegs the nominal interest rate, carefully counting the equations and unknowns 
reveals that IT does not determine the current price level when the time horizon is finite. 
 One advantage of working with a finite horizon is that not only can the horizon be 
arbitrarily large, but it can also be small, which enables us to think about and analyze relatively 
simple concrete examples.  This simplicity has enabled us to verify by example that the current 
price level is indeterminate under IT.  This simplicity also has allowed us to think more clearly 
about how IT works.  By doing so, we found that the only equation under IT that contains the 
current inflation is one which reflects the central bank looking at the current inflation rate when 
it sets the nominal interest rate.  Since it is absurd and totally against price theory to argue that a 
mechanism by which the current inflation rate affects the nominal interest rate is the mechanism 
by which the current inflation rate is determined, this adds to this paper’s argument that IT does 
not determine the current price level.  However, even with an infinite time horizon, that equation 
is still the only equation containing the current inflation rate.  Therefore, this argument against 
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the price determinacy of IT applies to infinite-horizon models as well as to finite-horizon 
models. 
 At this point, this paper has presented its logical arguments that IT does not determine the 
current price level.  Remaining to do is to give some intuitive understanding why.  To do so, let 
us use the simplicity of a finite-horizon model to help us to think more clearly about the 
mechanisms by which the current price level may be determined under a McCallum-Woodford 
PLT feedback rule.  Under PLT, the Fisher-Euler equation (6) is the mechanism by which Pt is 
determined from Rt and 





+1
1
t
t P
E .  Since Rt itself under the feedback rule (7) also is affected by 






+1
1
t
t P
E , equations (6) and (7) are the mechanisms by which 





t
s P
E 1  is determined from 

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
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1
t
s P
E  in a backwards fashion. 
 Under IT, 
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t
t P
E  is not determined, because the central bank is pursuing a inflation 
target not a price-level target.  The reason that 





+1
1
t
t P
E  is not determined is because the central 
bank will respond to changes in Pt not by returning to the original implied price-level target path, 
but by changing its price-level-target path to be consistent with the actual level of Pt.  In other 
words, if the future price level is not anchored, if 





+1
1
t
t P
E  is not determined, then the Fisher-
Euler equation (6) cannot determine Pt. 
An interesting mental exercise that can help the reader understand why IT leads to price 
indeterminacy is to look at a particular hybrid IT-PLT regime.  Assume that the central bank 
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targets the inflation rate for periods t=0,1,2,…,T-1, but at time T, the central bank pursues a 
price-level target announced at time t=0.  Label this time T price-level target as *TP .   For 
simplicity, assume aggregate output is constant, which means that the Fisher-Euler equation (6) 
can be rewritten as 






=
+1
11
t
tt
t P
ER
P
β  (28) 
which applies for t=0,1,…,T-1.  Also, for simplicity, assume the central bank sets the nominal 
interest rate equal to 
βpi * 1+= ttR  (29) 
for t=0,1,…,T-1. 
 Applying Belman’s principle and working backwards, we start at time T where the 
central bank sets MT so that *TT PP = .   At time t=T-1, the central bank sets βpi *1 TTR =− .  
Substituting this and *TT PP =  into (28) and solving for PT-1 gives **1 / TTT PP pi=− .  By backwards 
recursion, we conclude that 
 
∏
+=
= T
ts
s
T
t
PP
1
*
*
pi
 
This then shows that not only is P0 determined but so is Pt for t=0,1,2,…,T. 
 To make this more concrete and less abstract, assume T=3, β = 0.99, *tpi  = 1.02 for 
t=0,1,2,and 3.  Also assume that 3*3
* 02.1== PPT .  If you work backwards using Bellman’s 
principle, you should conclude that 33 02.1=P , 
2
2 02.1=P , 02.11 =P , and 00.10 =P . 
 Now change the model to pure IT by assuming the central bank sets the money supply at 
time T so that *TT pipi = .  As explained before, the current price level no longer is determined.  
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We can verify this for our T=3 example with β = 0.99, *tpi  = 1.02 for t=0,1,2,and 3.  Working 
backwards, we start at time t=3, where the central bank sets the money supply so that 02.13 =pi .  
Working backwards, at time t=2, the central bank will peg 99.0/02.1*22 == βpiR .  Substituting 
this into (28) gives 





=
3
2
2
102.11
P
E
P
.  Rearranging and noting that 233 / PP≡pi , this implies that 

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

=
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2E , which is always true.  Next, work backwards to time t=1, when the central 
bank will peg 99.0/02.1*11 == βpiR .  Substituting this into (28) gives 





=
2
1
1
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P
.  
Rearranging and noting that 122 / PP≡pi , this implies that 





=
2
1
1
02.1
1
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E .  Finally, work 
backwards to time t=0, when the central bank will peg 99.0/02.1*00 == βpiR .  Substituting this 
into (28) gives 





=
1
0
0
102.11
P
E
P
, which we can rearrange and get 





=
1
0
1
02.1
1
pi
E .  That’s it!  
There is no equation that contains 0pi .  I am sure you will confirm that the system is 
indeterminate. 
 This example demonstrates that for a finite-horizon economy, a hybrid IT-PLT does 
determine prices, whereas when we replace the price-level target at time T with an inflation 
target, the current price level becomes indeterminate.  The reason is that the Fisher-Euler 
equation is a mechanism by which Pt is determined from Rt and 





+1
1
t
t P
E .  If a future price level 
is anchored down such as *TT PP = , then applying Bellman’s principle and working backwards 
through the Fisher-Euler equation and the central-bank’s feedback rule for setting the nominal 
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interest does eventually lead us to determining P0.  However, if there is no anchoring of an 
expectation involving a future price level, then that mechanism does not work.  The reason IT 
does not determine the price-level is because the central bank is not committed to a particular 
targeted price level in the future; instead it is only committed to targeted inflation rate.  Hence, 
there is nothing anchoring down a future price level regardless whether the economy has a finite 
or an infinite time horizon.  Since there is no anchoring of the future price level under IT even in 
an infinite economy, this paper then concludes that the current price level is indeterminate under 
IT in an economy with a infinite horizon as well as a finite horizon. 
 That the current price level is undetermined under IT, but determined under PLT, means 
that if the public erroneously thought the central bank was pursuing PLT, the current price level 
would be determined.  However, just as Keynesian economic analysis fell apart in the late 1960s 
and 1970s when people learned how that system worked and adjusted their expectations 
accordingly (See Lucas, 1976), people will eventually learn from experience that the central 
bank is pursuing IT rather than PLT.  When they do so, then the economies of the world will 
likely experience great price instability because of the price indeterminacy of IT. 
 Such a doomsday prediction may be mitigated somewhat because if IT fails, central 
banks are likely to switch to something like PLT.  As mentioned before, IT followed by PLT 
does determine prices.  However, only if the central bank’s future price-level target or targets are 
known by people in advance will IT determine price levels.  Since the central bank will probably 
formulate its price-level targets anew when it abandons IT, the indeterminacy of IT remains, and 
the risk of this doomsday prediction remains. 
 Many may think this paper is a recommendation that the central bank target price levels 
rather than IT.  It is not.  While PLT under a McCallum-Woodford feedback rule for pegging the 
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nominal interest rate does determine prices, Eagle and Domian (2005) present a strong 
theoretical argument in favor of nominal-income targeting.  They argue that nominal-income 
targeting better handles real-output contingencies than does PLT. 
 Readers should note that this paper is based on rational expectations.  Since rational 
expectations is facilitated by economic agents understanding what the central bank is doing; I do 
fully endorse the transparency of the central bank.  That transparency is enhanced by the central 
bank being clear about what it is targeting and being committed to that target.  However, what 
this paper and papers like Eagle and Domian (2005) show is that we still are learning and 
probably have a great deal more to learn about monetary economics.  Thus, until the central bank 
understands what is best for it to do in all contingencies, the central bank needs to be flexible to 
change its targets based on its growing understanding of monetary economics and its growing 
understanding of what it should do in different contingencies. 
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